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Abstract 
Performance-based services acquisition (PBSA) is a proven strategy that 
reduces costs and improves the quality of service. Rather than specify inputs or 
service requirements, the Department of Defense (DoD) stipulates a level of 
performance that the contractor is then obligated to meet, or exceed. When used 
appropriately, this strategy aligns the objective of the contractor with that of the 
government customer, and can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
services provided.  
Recognizing the benefits, the DoD has sought to increase the appropriate use 
of PBSA. In 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
directed that 50 percent of service acquisitions be performance-based (measured in 
dollars and actions) by the year 2005 (Gansler, 2000). Based on data from the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), this report presents trends in PBSA over 
the last 15 years.   
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I. Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on the private sector to provide a 
wide range of services (these can include consulting and administrative support, 
information technology services, product maintenance services, and base operations 
support) to accomplish functions needed to deliver important defense capabilities. 
For example, in FY 2014, the DoD obligated $145 billion on contracted services; this 
accounted for more than half of the DoD’s total contract spending ($275 billion). 
Government-wide, the percentage of total contract dollars spent on service contracts 
has increased from 23% in 1985 to 63% in 2014 (Kelman, 2017). Because service 
contracting is such a significant component of government spending, several 
initiatives have been implemented over the years in an effort to improve the 
efficiency of service contracting. 
Performance-based services acquisition (PBSA) is a proven strategy that can 
reduce costs and improve the quality of service. Rather than specify inputs or 
service requirements, the customer stipulates a level of performance that the 
contractor is then obligated to meet or exceed. The contractor has the freedom to 
meet the objective using its resources and personnel to improve processes and 
effectiveness. This strategy aims to align the objective and incentives of the 
contractor with those of the customer. When properly structured, these contracts 
incentivize providers to improve their efficiency. 
In 2000, then-Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Jacques Gansler issued PBSA guidance: “It is the policy of the Department 
of Defense that, in order to maximize performance, innovation and competition, often 
at a savings, performance based strategies for the acquisition of services are to be 
used wherever possible” (Gansler, 2000). He went on to state that “In order to 
ensure that the DoD continually realizes these savings and performance gains, I 
establish, at a minimum, that 50% of service acquisitions, measured both in dollars 
and actions, are to be performance-based by the year 2005.” 
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How have the DoD and its constituent organizations responded to this 
mandate? This report will examine trends in PBSA over the course of the fifteen 
years. Is current use (extent and implementation) of PBSA appropriate? How can 
use be improved? 
To answer these questions, we analyzed data from the Federal Procurement 
Data System (FPDS). We disaggregated the data (by sector, agency, year, contract-
type, etc.) to capture the trends and patterns related to PBSA. Then, in an effort to 
contextualize our findings, we present two case studies—the Navy Marine Corps 
Intranet and the Army’s Stryker PBL—which highlight some of the challenges 
regarding PBSA and contract type. Based on our analysis, we present findings and 
recommendations aimed at improving PBSA implementation. 
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II. Background 
 
Figure 1. FY 2015 DoD service contracts spending by NAICS code (action obligations 
in billions; analysis of FPDS data) 
 
The DoD contracts for a large variety of services, ranging from building 
maintenance to weapons design, healthcare, education, transportation, and food 
services. In fact, over half of federal acquisition dollars are spent by the DoD. The 
FAR (2010) defines a contract for services as an agreement “that directly engages 
the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an 
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply” (DoD, 2009). Figure 1 
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Services vs. Supplies 
In FY 2015, the DoD obligated $275 billion. Of this amount, $130 billion, or 
47% was spent on non-service contracts (supplies); $145 billion (53%) was spent on 
services, a figure that includes contracted R&D (see Figure 2). In the 1980s, DoD 
spending on services contracts averaged only 39%  (U.S. General Services 
Administration, 2009). Given the current and projected magnitude of spending on 
contracted services, improving the efficiency of their acquisition is of utmost 
importance, especially given continued concern over the DoD's current acquisition 
policies.  Critics point to growing numbers of “undefinitized contracts,” large numbers 
of cost-based contracts, the lack of adequate metrics, a general lack of coordination 
with regard to the procurement of services, and a lack of confidence that the DoD is 
optimizing the value received from these contracts (House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services, 2009).   
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PBSA Defined 
The broad application of PBSA in the federal government, state and local 
government, and the private sector has produced many definitions of performance 
based contracting. The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines PBSA as “an 
acquisition structured around the results to be achieved as opposed to the manner 
by which the work is to be performed.”  The Department of Defense guidebook says 
PBSA “involves acquisition strategies, methods, and techniques that describe and 
communicate measurable outcomes rather than direct performance processes” 
(DoD, 2000). The definition used by the National Institute of Governmental 
Purchasing (2012) adds an important distinction: compensation. Performance-based 
contracting “is a results-oriented contracting method that focuses on the outputs, 
quality, or outcomes that may tie at least a portion of a contractor’s payment, 
contract extensions, or contract renewals to the achievement of specific, measurable 
performance standards and requirements.” Figure 3 shows the proportion of PBSA 
within the context of overall DoD contracts spending. 
 
 
Figure 3. 2015 DoD contracts spending (action obligations in $billions; analysis of 
FPDS data). 
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Theoretical Basis  
PBSA contracts specify a desired result, without stipulating the work be 
performed in any specific way. This method of contracting diverges from traditional 
contracting approaches (called compliance contracting or regulatory contracting), 
which do include narrow specifications on how the result is delivered. Such 
restrictions prevent the contractor from profiting from any innovations, and minimize 
the incentive to develop them in the first place.  
PBSA, instead, permits greater flexibility. Contractors are free to pursue 
efficiencies and innovations that will reduce the cost of meeting the contract’s 
requirements.  
The goal of a PBSA arrangement is to align the incentives of the suppliers 
with the purchaser, transforming it so that what benefits the buyer can also benefit 
the supplier. Consider the case of an auto mechanic. Instead of paying on a 
transactional basis, (i.e. when the mechanic performs a repair when there is a 
malfunction), the driver pays the mechanic a fixed sum annually to maintain the car 
in an operational condition with a specified availability. This shift produces results by 
“changing the rules of cooperation so that the self-interested rational choices the 
agent is likely to make fulfill the outcomes that the principal desires” (Taylor & 
Shaver, 2010). Such an arrangement of incentives discourages suppliers from 
performing behaviors which are beneficial to themselves, but diminish the quality or 
availability of the service delivered. 
There are other benefits to PBSA as well. For one, it may offer a resolution to 
the “historic disconnect between the motivation for governments to contract and how 
they actually go about contracting” (Martin, 2016). This disconnect arises when 
governments contract for services with the expectation that the superior efficiency of 
private firms will delivery those services more cheaply and reliably. However, by 
employing the rigid process specifications (which detail how the work is to be 
performed) common to non-performance-based contracting, governments hinder the 
contractor’s ability to innovate and thereby minimize or negate the private firm’s 
primary advantage; the strictness of such a contract may disallow a contractor from 
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exploiting whatever innovations and resulting efficiencies. Such a contractual 
arrangement is, in part, self-defeating. By instead embracing performance 
specifications, PBSA allows contractors to profit from reduced costs or innovation. 
Furthermore, reducing the focus on specifications, also decrease public expenditure 
by reducing the need for oversight by government personnel. We elaborate upon the 
benefits and drawbacks of PBSA in Part III.  
In the private sector, certain industries have embraced the use of 
performance based contracting. Commercial airlines, for instance, were among the 
first to do so. Performance- based contracting in this industry took the form of 
‘power-by-the-hour’ contracts, in which aircraft engines and maintenance are 
provided for a fixed sum per flight-hour the engine is in use, rather than as a fee for 
the service of engine maintenance. Previously, the engine manufacturers had less 
incentive to perform preventive maintenance, since they stood to gain from more 
lucrative repairs and maintenance in the future. It is important to stress that the 
incentives involved can be powerful. For example, Dennis and Kambil (2003) found 
that in 2003 General Motors’ profit rate on after-sales maintenance was much higher 
than that earned through the sale of its cars. In contrast, under fixed sum per flight-
hour schemes, manufacturers only receive payment when the engine is in use, 
thereby rewarding availability and reliability. This strategy ensures the engine is 
available more often and at lower cost.  
The principles of PBSA have led to reforms in the health care industry as well, 
under the guise of pay for performance. Pay for performance introduces financial 
incentives to medical personnel to achieve more optimal patient outcomes rather 
than be compensated strictly for services performed. The similarities are evident. 
Furthermore, the clear links between private industry health care and public health 
care shows that PBSA concepts work in both sectors and between them. The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sponsors a Value-Based Purchasing 
system, intended to pay “for inpatient acute care services based on the quality of 
care, not just quantity of the services they provide” (Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015).  
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Elements of PBSA 
The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the 
Department of Defense identifies four elements that are required, at a minimum, for 
an acquisition to be performance-based: (1) a performance work statement, 
describing the requirement as a measurable outcome; (2) measurable performance 
standards, used to define acceptable outcomes and determine if performance 
thresholds have been achieved; (3) remedies, the incentives and penalties used to 
provide incentives for performance; and (4) a performance assessment plan, 
detailing performance metrics as well as  how the contractor will be evaluated 
(Gansler, 2000).  
 
Figure 4. Seven Steps to PBSA (Interagency-Industry Partnership in Performance, 
2006) 
In 2006, the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department 
of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, the General Services Administration, and a 
private firm, Acquisition Solutions, issued a joint guidebook entitled Seven Steps to 
Performance-Based Services Acquisition.  The steps outlined by the guidebook are 
presented in Figure 4.    
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III. Benefits and Drawbacks 
The benefits of PBSA have been espoused by numerous government and 
private-sector organizations. We have aggregated and summarized these benefits. 
Benefits 
Improved performance – PBSA helps align the objectives of the contractor 
with those of the government.  Contractors, tasked with achieving outcomes as 
opposed to fulfilling tasks, (1) have the freedom to implement the strategy that would 
provide best value to the customer, (2) can update their methods without the need to 
change contractual obligations, and (3) have the incentive to achieve their best 
performance.  These conditions foster the best effort and innovation on the part of 
the contractor, maximize the potential for the government to receive optimal 
contractor performance, and result in a “win-win” for both the government and the 
contractor. 
Lower cost – Top commercial firms have used performance-based contracts 
to reduce costs of services even as they raise performance. The federal 
government, unlike the private sector in its budgetary processes, is not focused on 
profits; rather, it is focused on transparency; minimizing fraud, waste, and abuse; 
holding public servants accountable; and costs.  The federal government thus often 
retains more cost-inefficient practices and processes, and will significantly benefit 
from PBSA’s cost savings. 
Increased innovation – PBSA encourages innovation by granting firms 
flexibility to determine the processes they use to perform the required function. Since 
they are incentivized throughout the contract to meet the required metrics while 
minimizing the cost, competitive firms will continuously innovate to improve their 
processes while reducing costs.   
Greater use of commercial services – As noted in a memo issued by the 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, “the vast 
majority of service requirements are commercial in nature” (Gansler, 2000). 
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Although government policy explicitly embraces greater use of commercial off-the-
shelf technologies and commercial standards, the DoD has been slow to fully 
implement these policies. By focusing on performance over process, PBSA helps to 
reduce barriers to entry for commercial firms.   
More effective oversight – Traditionally, the DoD has spent a large amount of 
resources verifying that contractors comply with the detailed processes and 
procedures the government specifies in its contracts—regardless of whether such 
compliance produces better outcomes.  For over two decades, the DoD has been 
committed to reforms that “ensure that oversight and review of contract management 
add value to the process and are minimally intrusive” (DoD, 1995). With the 
performance-based contract structure, the government can reduce the cost and 
increase the effectiveness of its oversight by tracking appropriately selected 
performance metrics to monitor contractor performance.  
Greater contractor-government cooperation – DoD services are provided 
through an ever-widening network of contractors.  Through several attributes listed 
above, PBSA encourages a greater contractor-government partnership that is more 
collaborative and less adversarial than traditional contracting, which implies that 
companies cannot be trusted to provide a service without being told how to do it.  
PBSA, on the other hand, is predicated on trust and accountability.  Private 
companies are given more flexibility to find cost-effective solutions, and also agree 
to meet the required performance metrics, which are often used to determine 
incentives.   
Greater agility – Contracting for services affords a greater surge staffing 
capability, giving the DoD a cost-efficient way to augment capabilities during times of 
increased demand.  On the other hand, during times of decreased demand, the DoD 
can quickly save operating costs by reducing its reliance on services contractors, 
something not possible with full-time government employees.  Moreover, when 
contracting for services, there is no long-tail cost: the DoD does not have any 
financial obligation to contractors once the service is delivered or no longer required.  
Services contracting can also provide the DoD with quick access to required 
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expertise; by contrast, the time required for the DoD to advertise a job position, 
review applications, perform job interviews, and make job offers is often 
considerably longer.   
Drawbacks 
Drawbacks, both real and perceived, have also emerged.  
Perception that the government has less control – Critics of PBSA argue that 
the government, by not issuing explicit specifications, will have less control, and as a 
result, could receive less satisfactory performance. This has been shown not to be 
the case, as the government must identify its critical desired outcomes and then 
identify the appropriate performance metrics necessary to incentivize the contractor. 
In many ways this is a superior way of managing outcomes in comparison to the 
traditional method, which has proven to be highly inefficient.   
Questionable applicability – Several critics of PBSA argue that this strategy 
can only be used for certain types of services. Most of these critics argue that PBSA 
is best used for contracts that include “many common, routine, and relatively simple 
services” (Edwards & Nash, 2007).  PBSA should not be used when objectives “are 
too long-term and complex to permit complete specification of results and 
competitive pricing at the outset of contracting” (Edwards & Nash, 2007).   
Ineffective metrics – Appropriately chosen metrics (1) direct contractor efforts 
and (2) provide effective oversight. Although concern for appropriate metrics is valid 
for all DoD contracts, ineffective metrics particularly undermine PBSA contracts 
because they form the basis of evaluating contractor performance. Metrics and 
corresponding incentives help align the interests of the contractor with the 
government. If the two are not aligned because metrics misdirect contractors 
towards unimportant services, then such contracts will be implemented with 
suboptimal results. Additionally, the government’s oversight must rely on accurate, 
independently verified data.  In many cases, however, the contractors usually furnish 
the government with this data, presenting a potential conflict of interest. For the 
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incentives to be effective, the government must have reliable data that it can use to 
provide oversight of a contractor’s performance.  
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IV. Trends in PBSA 
 
In 1991 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (within the Office of 
Management and Budget) issued Policy Letter 91-2, which ushered in the formal 
adoption of PBSA by government. The letter declared “It is the policy of the Federal 
Government that (1) agencies use performance-based contracting methods to the 
maximum extent practicable when acquiring services and (2) agencies carefully 
select acquisition and contract administration strategies, methods, and techniques 
that best accommodate the requirements” (OFPP Letter 91-2, 1991). Subsequent 
Federal legislation like the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 
1993, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act of 1995 formalized this commitment. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation was not amended to incorporate PBSA 
policies contained in OFPP’s policy letter 91-2 until 1997 (GAO, 2008). FAR Part 37 
provides the DoD with the policy and procedures that are specific to the acquisition 
and management of contracted services. This Part also identifies performance-
based acquisition as the DoD’s “preferred method for acquiring services…[which 
should be used] to the maximum extent practicable,” except in certain 
circumstances. FAR Part 37 also states that the DoD should facilitate greater use of 
PBSA by reducing barriers to competition and by providing sufficient training to DoD 
service acquisition personnel. 
In 2000, the DoD formalized its commitment to PBSA. Then-Under Secretary 
of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Jacques Gansler issued new 
guidance: “In order to ensure that the DoD continually realizes these savings and 
performance gains, I establish, at a minimum, that 50% of service acquisitions, 
measured both in dollars and actions, are to be performance-based by the year 
2005.”    
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Historical Trends 
Within service contracts, the composition of performance-based and non-
performance-based has changed substantially over the last 15 years. Analysis of the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) shows that PBSA now constitutes a 
majority of total DoD service contract spending. Figure 5 shows the composition of 
PBC and non-PBC contracts among all DoD service contracts. In absolute terms, 
non-performance contracts have declined by more than two-thirds since their 2008 
peak, from $146 billion to $46 billion in 2015, while performance-based contracts 
have plateaued at approximately $100 billion in 2014 and 2015.  
 












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Of which performance-based ($)
Of which non-performance-based ($)
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To a lesser extent, civilian service contracting has seen the same change in 
contract composition. Performance-based contracts represent more than 50% of all 
civilian service contracts, and, in 2015, accounted for $70 billion of the total $125 
billion spent. Figure 6 shows the composition of service contracts outside of the 
DoD. The pattern is smoother overall, but shows PBSA contracts overtaking non-
PBSA contracts at the same point in time.  
 
 
Figure 6. Civilian service contracts (action obligations in $billions; analysis of FPDS 
data) 
It is also noteworthy that as PBSA began to overtake non-PBSA in terms of 
total services contract spending, so, too, did the DoD begin to overtake civilian 












Of which performance-based ($)
Of which non-performance-based ($)
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of policy  16 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
 
Figure 7. PBSA contracts (action obligations [$]; analysis of FPDS data) 
 
Figure 8 depicts total spending on services contracts and the percentage of 
the spending that was performance-based over the last 15 years. The figure also 
highlights important events that that undoubtedly impacted the use of PBSA. Note 
that following the 2000 issuance of the directive to increase PBSA such that it would 
represent 50% of all service contracts spending by 2005, PBSA increased by more 
than 15% in 2001. The beginning of the War in Iraq saw a continued increase in both 
services spending and reliance on PBSA. However, between 2006 and 2007 PBSA 
declined, reaching a four-year low in 2008 (regarded as the height of the war), even 
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Figure 8. Trends in DoD PBSA (action obligations in $billions; analysis of FPDS data) 
This decline occurred despite a change in FPDS classification of PBSA 
contracts. Prior to 2005, FPDS required that “a minimum of 80 percent of the 
requirements under the procurement action must meet the FAR standards.” In 2005, 
the minimum was reduced to 50%. All else equal, one would expect this change to 
increase PBSA contracts spending. That this was not the case might suggest that 
the spending figures alone understate the impact of the War in Iraq on PBSA. This 
decline is unsurprising. Edwards and Nash, Jr. (2007), who have been critical of 
PBSA—specifically, its applicability to the provision of complex services—assert that 
“it is unrealistic to ask agencies to specify services at the time of contract award in 
clear, specific, objective, and measurable terms when future needs are not fully 
known or understood, requirements and priorities are expected to change during 
performance, and the circumstances and conditions of performance are not reliably 
foreseeable.” There is no doubt that this scenario often prevails during war, which 
likely explains the apparent reluctance to use PBSA. Interestingly, however, prior 
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research (e.g. Lucyshyn, Rigilano, & Safai, 2016) indicates that PBSA can be 
implemented successfully during times of conflict, provided that contracts are 
structured appropriately.  
PBSA at Present  
Despite falling short of the mandate that 50% of service contract be 
performance-based by 2005, PBSA spending has increased dramatically within the 
DoD. In 2015, 68% of DoD contracts for services were performance-based. This 
increase has been more or less uniform throughout the department. As of FY 2015, 
PBSA rates for the military service branches were as follows: Air Force, 69%; Army, 
62%; and Navy, 58%. The appendix of this report provides a more detailed analysis 
of PBSA rates for the military service branches. 
Moreover, as indicated in Figure 6, the DoD has outpaced civilian government 
in the use of PBSA (68% vs. 56% in FY 2015). Of course, this high-level data may 
not tell the whole story. As indicated previously, the change in threshold of a 
contracts performance elements from 80% to 50% to be categorized as performance 
based, is not reflected in this data. In addition, some contracts may be performance-
based “in name only,” either lacking enforcement mechanisms or disbursing 
payments even when performance is suboptimal. In other words, the data may not 
accurately reflect the extent to which performance-based strategies are actually 
applied.  
While PBSA may appeal to program officials from a theoretical standpoint, 
some may be reluctant to embrace this strategy for a variety of reasons, including 
cultural inertia within the DoD, contractor reluctance, and/or an inability (lack of 
personnel or technical capacity) to measure contract performance. Indeed, a recent 
DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) report evaluated 60 DoD performance-based 
contracts. The report revealed that DoD contracting personnel failed to properly 
negotiate and evaluate most of the contracts. For example, in 33 instances the DoD 
failed to clearly define criteria for successful completion of various tasks, but 
disbursed payments to the contractors on a regular basis (DoD IG, 2013).  
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More generally, a wealth of studies dating back to the 1980s (e.g. Hart & 
Holmstrom, 1987) suggests a disinclination on the part of managers to use pay-for-
performance strategies for reasons that are “distinctly uneconomic” including notions 
of fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture (Baker, Jensen, & 
Murphy, 1998).  
PBSA and Performance-Based Logistics 
Data on one form of PBSA—Performance-Based Logistics (PBL)—is mixed. 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines PBL as “…the purchase of support as 
an integrated, affordable, performance package designed to optimize system 
readiness and meet performance goals for a weapon system through long-term 
support arrangements with clear lines of authority and responsibility.” Application of 
PBL may be at the system, subsystem, or major assembly level depending on 
program unique circumstances and appropriate business case analysis. 
While overall PBL expenditure has increased steadily over the last 15 years, 
likely due to its expansion within successful programs, there were only 87 PBL 
programs in 2013, compared to over 200 in 2005. PBL programs evolve along a 
common trajectory. With new systems, cost-plus reimbursement contracts followed 
by cost-plus incentive contracts are used in order to provide the government 
customer and the provider with a cost baseline. Once the costs, risk factors, and 
system failure modes and rates have stabilized, the program transitions to the use of  
fixed-price contracts where providers are paid a fixed cost or fixed rate (e.g. per 
hour, per mile) so long as operational readiness is achieved at the specified level(s). 
Over time, the provider makes improvements to its supply chain, logistics networks, 
operations, and the system itself in order to reduce costs and increase profitability. 
In the “terminal stage” of its evolution, the exemplary PBL achieves consistently high 
availability and has optimized maintenance processes and the associated logistics 
networks on which they rely. The program operates at lower risk, from both a cost 
and technical perspective.  
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Despite successful outcomes, there are indications that some longstanding 
PBL programs are reverting to traditional contracting approaches. Recently, for 
instance, a high-profile, award-winning PBL program, the High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System, transitioned inventory management from the contractor to the 
government and reverted to cost-reimbursement contracts—as opposed to fixed-
price— in an effort to reduce costs. This program is still categorized as 
“performance-based” in that it relies, at least ostensibly, on performance metrics for 
inventory fill-rates. 
PBSA and contract type 
However, data on the use of fixed-price PBSA lends support to the 
supposition that the DoD is increasing its reliance on performance-based strategies 
(see Figure 9). While it is important to stress that PBSA is a strategy amenable to 
the use of different types of contracts, fixed-price contracts are generally preferred 
(FAR 37.102), especially once an acquisition program is well established. Fixed-
price contracts incentivize providers to innovate in order to reduce their costs 
thereby increasing their profit. The cost reductions achieved by the provider can then 
be taken into account by government in determining baselines for future contracts. 
Figure 9 indicates that within the DoD, the trend in fixed-price contracting tracks 
closely with the PBSA trend, both of which overtook “non-performance-based” and 
“other than fixed-price” in 2010. 
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Figure 9. DoD services contracts (action obligations in $billions; analysis of FPDS 
data) 
At the same time, the figure makes it clear that the fixed-price contracting 
trend may deviate from the performance-based one. During the height of the Iraq 
War, in 2008, fixed-price contracts and “non-performance-based” spiked.  
In fact, between 2006 and 2013, most performance-based contracts were 
other than fixed-price (see Figure 10). As of FY 2015, roughly half of all DoD 
performance-based contracts were fixed-price. This finding stands in contrast to the 
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Figure 10. DoD Performance-based service contracts (action obligations [$]; analysis 
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V. Cases 
Stryker PBL 
The U.S. Army’s first new 
vehicle since the early 1990s, 
the M1126 Stryker is a rapidly-
deployable wheeled armored 
vehicle. Stryker successfully 
combines resiliency, mobility, 
and versatility, creating and the 
ideal combat vehicle and 
quickly becoming an essential 
tool for the United States Armed 
Forces.  
 As top Army officials became increasingly frustrated with the attributes of 
existing combat vehicles—many of which were either too heavy to be deployed 
efficiently or too light to be effective in combat—the Army began its search for a new 
armored vehicle for its fleet. The acquisition process was accelerated as US troops 
in Iraq and Afghanistan began to encounter unprecedented threats from improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), heightening the need for a new armored vehicle. Indeed, 
the Stryker vehicle was among the fastest acquisitions of a major weapons system 
in U.S. history.  
Awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems in 2000, the initial PBL for the 
Stryker vehicle fell under a Cost-Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) portion of a larger contract 
for vehicle manufacture and delivery. The CPFF covered “all fielded vehicles in 
garrison or deployed” (Coryell, 2007) for a five year period. Under the agreement, 
GDLS would produce and repair and maintain vehicles at four primary locations: 
Anniston, Alaska, Ontario, and London (Denizer, 2007).  
The CPFF contract was chosen to provide maximum flexibility to meet 
rapidly-evolving conditions while allowing Army officials to gauge the costs 
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associated with different levels of performance so that a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
contract could be used at a later point (Coryell, 2007). The initial contract specified a 
single metric, an operational readiness rate (ORR). Vehicles were expected to meet 
a 98% ORR during fielding and training exercises, and at least a 90% ORR for 
deployed vehicles. 
GDLS would go on to win two follow-on PBL contracts, in 2007 and 2012, 
valued at $1.5 billion and $2.5 billion respectively, which would extend sustainment 
and support for the growing Stryker fleet. In 2007, some 1,500 vehicles had been 
fielded; by 2012, this number had risen to close to 2,500 (DoD IG, 2012).  
For the first two Stryker brigades that deployed to Iraq, Army officials reported 
operational readiness rates averaging 96% from October 2003 through September 
2005 (GAO, 2006a). In addition, the Army consistently noted that contractors were 
providing impressive levels of support and according to a 2006 GAO report, more 
knowledgeable and efficient than their military counterparts with regard to the 
specifics of the Stryker vehicles (GAO, 2006a). The program’s use of contractor 
personnel for sustainment efforts allowed soldiers on the ground to participate in 
extra trainings and perform other necessary, military specific, roles (GAO, 2006a). 
Pre-existing relationships between soldiers within SBCT and deployed contractors 
also created a successful and effective work environment overseas. 
From a cost perspective, however, contract performance is less clear. In 
2012, The DoD Inspector General asserted that the follow-on contract’s continued 
use of a sole metric  (readiness), in combination with a high-ceiling, cost-plus 
contract, which unduly incentivized the contractor to accumulate significant excess 
inventory valued at $335.9 million (DoD IG, 2012). The Army responded that the 
excess inventory could be attributed, in part, to contractor improvements in reliability, 
and that the spare parts would be used eventually, albeit at a slower pace than 
anticipated (DoD IG, 2012).  
Given the Army’s heavy reliance on Stryker during the Iraq War, changing 
operational tempos, and the lack of historical cost data, the use of a cost-plus fixed 
fee contract (as opposed to a fixed-price contract) was well-founded. However, it 
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appears that the Army could have implemented better cost controls, perhaps by 
tying the fixed fee to an agreed-upon cost-per-mile metric. As indicated in the 
previous section, the DAU lists cost-per-unit metrics as essential indicators of PBL 
performance. 
Navy/Marine Corps Intranet 
The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI) is a major program that provides 
information technology services to the United 
States Navy and Marine Corps. NMCI seeks to 
provide a streamlined, secure, enterprise-wide 
network to support the naval shore 
establishment and connect it with forces at sea 
by interfacing with the at-sea network. In 2000, 
the Navy signed a 5 year performance-based 
contract with Electronic Data Systems Corp 
(EDS) worth an initial $4.1 billion with a three year option to extend. The Navy 
expected the network to have 412,000 to 416,000 operational computers, or “seats” 
by fiscal year 2004. However, deployment of the network was slower than planned 
and the program suffered setbacks that delayed its implementation, reduced its 
desired responsiveness, and increased its cost. 
Early in the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) development, the Navy made 
two important decisions. First, the services of the NMCI would be largely outsourced.  
Second, the contract would be performance-based.   
The Navy primarily sought to contract with the private sector because it did 
not believe that the Navy had the capability to develop and implement such a holistic 
information system.  Given that the Navy did not believe that it could develop such a 
capability, and that it wished to implement the NMCI as quickly as possible, 
contracting much of the technical work to the private sector was the Navy's only 
realistic option.   
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The Navy produced an extensive performance plan for the program. The 
Navy started by identifying its two strategic goals, information superiority and 
fostering innovation. The Navy then identified nine strategic performance 
measurement categories and related them to the strategic goals of the NMCI 
program. These nine categories were interoperability; security and information 
assurance; workforce capabilities; process improvement; operational performance; 
service efficiency; customer satisfaction; program management; and network 
operations and maintenance (GAO, 2006).  The plan included "metrics, targets, and 
comparative baselines that were to be used for the first annual performance report... 
[along with the Navy's commitment to] fully develop performance measures for each 
of the categories and... produce an annual report on NMCI’s performance in each of 
the categories” (GAO,  2006b).   
In October of 2000, the Navy awarded the NMCI contract to Electronics Data 
Systems (EDS).  The contract was a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-
quantity contract with performance incentives. The quality of performance was 
measured according to a set “contractually specified performance level 
expectations” called Service- Level Agreements (SLAs). The terms of the NMCI 
contract include delivery and maintenance of workstations and desktop applications, 
transmission of voice, video, and data, and infrastructure improvements. 
The sole-source contract had a 5-year base agreement with a minimum value 
of $4.1 billion, along with a 3-year option for an additional $2.8 billion. The contract 
required delivery of approximately 415,000 seats. The contract was subsequently 
restructured in 2003 into a 7-year, “$6 billion contract with a 3-year option for an 
additional $2.8 billion” (GAO, 2006b). 
The NMCI experienced development difficulties and program revisions early 
in development initiation. These difficulties became evident once the Navy and the 
contractor tallied the total number of legacy programs currently operating on Navy 
and Marine legacy systems.  Legacy programs presented numerous compatibility 
issues. Delays stemmed from the need to (1) undertake an extensive review to list 
and categorize all legacy applications, (2) develop a new strategy to digest the 
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number of applications that were orders of magnitude larger than originally believed, 
and finally, (3) put the new implementation strategy into effect.  According to Jordan 
(2007), "it was initially assumed that the number of [outdated legacy] applications 
was in the thousands. After contract award, the Navy and EDS were shocked to find 
the number was actually 100,000".  The contract goal of transitioning legacy 
applications into 500 NMCI accredited programs was revealed to be a much more 
difficult task than initially thought.   
By May 2002, only 4,000 seats had been cutover.  Due to NMCI’s slow 
progress, Congress, in December 2002, sought to strengthen oversight by requiring 
authorization to increase the seat limits beyond 60,000, and then up to 150,000.    
In 2003, EDS shareholders filed a class-action lawsuit against the company 
alleging security fraud stemming from second quarter losses, primarily due to 
“problem contracts.”  According to EDS, difficulties with the NMCI contract resulted 
in a $334 million pretax loss on the program through 2003 (Verton, 2003). 
Subsequently, the Navy and EDS restructured the NMCI's contract and 
implementation schedule. One report estimates that EDS losses averaged $800 
million annually in the first years of the contract, totaling $3 billion (Jordan, 2007).   
Acknowledging the NMCI’s shortcomings, the Navy awarded a one-year $5.9 
million contract to BearingPoint in December 2006 to help manage IT services 
(Beizer, 2006).  BearingPoint was awarded a larger 5-year contract, with a maximum 
value of $57.9 million in October 2007, principally to “design and operate a secure, 
battle-ready global information technology network for the Naval Network Warfare 
Command” (Hubler, 2007).  This action solidified the subtle—if unofficial—shift away 
from the NMCI’s initial goal of information superiority (in the form of a battle-ready 
information system) to simply furnishing the Navy with an operational information 
network.   
The NMCI experience demonstrates that firm-fixed-price contracts for high-
risk, ambitious programs do not necessarily reduce program costs.  Rather, fixed-
price contracts are ideal when requirements are known and stable, and the technical 
risk is low. The experience also shows that the metrics included in performance-
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of policy  28 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
based contracts may produce unfavorable outcomes if consequences are not 
anticipated.  For instance, the metrics involving e-mail transfers and the percent of 
bandwidth used to provide connection to external networks provided EDS an 
incentive to severely limit the size of e-mail attachments, frustrating many who were 
unable to transmit larger files. 
Following the program’s early challenges, NMCI steadily improved.  On 
September 30, 2010, the NMCI contract ended and the new Continuity of Services 
Contract (COSC) began. Today, NMCI is one of the largest intranets in the world, 
providing end-to-end secure IT services to more than 400,000 computers and 
800,000 users across 2,500 locations (U.S. Navy, 2017). At present, the Navy is 
transitioning NMCI services to the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). The 
NGEN acquisition approach will allow NMCI to transition from a “monolithic model” 
to a segmented business model that allows for periodic competition of segmented 
services (U.S. Navy, 2017). 
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VI. Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion  
Findings 
Below is a summary of our findings. 
• Based on the available data, the DoD has made impressive gains in its 
implementation of PBSA. 
• In 2016, close to 70% of DoD services contracts were performance-based. 
• The rate of PBSA within the DoD has increased steadily since 2010, even as 
overall spending on services has decreased. 
• Despite increases in the overall rate of PBSA, PBL implementation, in terms 
of the number of programs, has declined.  
• The DoD has outpaced the rest of the government in the implementation of 
PBSA.  
• DoD guidance states that fixed-price contracts are preferred within the 
context of PBSA.  The proportion of DoD performance-based contracts that 
are fixed-price has increased to approximately 50% in 2016, up from a low of 
29% in 2007. The civilian PBSA rate was 38% in 2016.  
• PBSA is not the right choice for all acquisitions and even when it is the right 
choice, performance-based contracts are not always structured appropriately.  
 
Recommendations 
Based on these findings, we provide the following recommendations. 
• Ensure proper alignment of government objectives with provider 
incentives. 
PBSA arrangements can be more challenging to develop and manage than 
other contract types. Just as an appropriate program structure aligns the 
incentives of the customer (the government) and the support provider, leading 
to a win-win scenario, an inappropriate structure can create perverse 
incentives, and result in undesired or unintended consequences.  
• Improve the training of the acquisition workforce. 
The DoD should also increase the training of its employees involved in the 
acquisition of services. Training should emphasize the importance of a robust 
requirements definition process, the need for clear performance 
requirements, measurable performance and standards. 
• Cost-plus performance-based services contracts must apply stringent 
cost controls.   
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Categorizing a contract as performance-based does not make it so, especially 
with regard to cost-plus contracts. While some performance-based services 
acquisitions are best suited to cost-plus contracts, they must be structured 
appropriately to ensure optimal outcomes. Carefully-considered contract 
ceilings, cost-per-unit usage rates, and logistics footprint constraints should 
be included in cost-plus contracts. Without these features, contractors may be 
incentivized to accrue surplus inventory beyond what is necessary to meet 
the performance requirement. 
Conclusion 
Steven Kelman, former administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy, observed that historically, “the balance between attention to the goals the 
[procurement] system should pursue and the constraints under which the system 
operates was skewed towards assuring compliance with constraints more than 
pursuing goals.” Kelman notes that in recent years there has been a major 
improvement in the culture of the federal procurement system “in a more 
performance-oriented direction” by which he means that the present system is more 
focused on delivering timely, best-value products and services. If Kelman is right that 
performance has improved, then there can be little doubt that the growth in PBSA, 
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